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Abstract 
In Britain, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act has revolutionised the 
regulation of party finance after several half-hearted failures at attempted reform. In 
France, a series of high profile corruption scandals in the 1980s and 1990s provoked a 
bout of ‘legislative incontinence’ – resulting in over eight laws in seven years, which 
profoundly transformed the regime regulating party finance. The comparative 
analysis of reforms in each country presented here questions the utility of crude 
‘constitutional engineering’ theories, and the notion of party system ‘cartelisation’ by 
major parties, neither of which offers a wholly convincing account of the paths of 
reform in Britain and France. It explores the use of new institutionalist theories as a 
comparative framework and concludes that these provide a cogent explanation for the 
alternative paths taken by each country with party finance regulation. 
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Introduction 
In Britain, until February 2001, when the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
2000 came into force, the funding regime was still shaped by the Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices (Prevention) Act 1883. In France, in the first thirty years after the formation of the 
Fifth Republic, party funding had not been the subject of any legislative attention. In both 
cases, prior to reform, the funding regime was characterised by a distinctly laissez-faire 
approach, and an attachment to voluntarist values. Indeed, one initial hurdle to overcome in 
party funding reform was that parties in Britain and France were not even recognised as legal 
entities. In this article we explore the similarities and differences between the respective 
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reform processes in France and Britain. The desire to reform the regime regulating party 
finance in France provoked a bout of ‘legislative incontinence’ – resulting in over eight laws 
in seven years, whilst in Britain, there is just the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000 to draw upon. We focus on comparing the initial French propositions with the 
British reforms, concentrating on a number of instruments of party funding reform, selected 
by the criteria of degree of significance and comparability.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Our comparative analysis of party finance reform uses a most similar system design. Both 
France and Britain have broadly similar party systems. Moreover, party funding regimes in 
both countries have been characterised historically by a lack of regulation and a voluntary 
tradition of financing parties. As far as explaining the similarities and differences, various 
forms of the so-called new institutionalism arguably provide appropriate starting points. New 
institutionalism itself is fairly ill defined. Little consensus exists as to its form (Thelen & 
Steinmo, 1992: 2, 11). That may or may not matter. On the one hand, critics might argue that 
since few can agree on the scope of new institutionalism, then its utility may be marginal. 
Moreover, there may be danger in simply re-stating existing theories, and then describing 
them as a form of new institutionalism. On the other hand, whilst proponents of new 
institutionalism may differ in interpretations of scope, they are united by the fact that they 
acknowledge the importance of non-institutional models and seek to incorporate lessons from 
these into a less discrete interpretation of the importance of institutions. Broadly speaking, we 
adhere to the latter view. For this analysis we draw principally upon two variations of new 
institutionalism; normative institutionalism and historical institutionalism, as well as 
considering a variety of theories of institutional change. It is worth briefly outlining the 
principal aspects of these approaches. 
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Normative Institutionalism 
 
The term ‘institution’ within this ‘new’ institutionalism is understood broadly, following 
Huntington (1968: 12), as ‘a stable, recurring pattern of behaviour’ (Goodin 1996: 22). March 
& Olsen (1984: 738) identify institutions as ‘collections of standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend interests’. Normative institutionalism explicitly focuses on 
and takes account of the way in which institutions embody values. Although there is 
recognition of the interaction of institutions and individuals, and indeed of ideas, institutions 
and interests (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 14, 23), normative institutionalism assumes that 
political institutions influence behaviour by shaping ‘values, norms, interests, identities and 
beliefs’ (March & Olsen 1989: 17). It is ‘normative’ in the sense that it sees norms and values 
as explanatory variables. 
 
The means by which values impact upon behaviour is through the generation of norms, rules, 
understandings and routines that ‘define appropriate actions’ (March & Olsen 1984: 741; 
1989: 21-6). This ‘logic of appropriateness’ can constrain and shape the behaviour of actors. 
Actors consider whether behaviour is consistent with the internal norms or value structure of 
the institution. Thus choice are constrained by what Peters calls ‘the parameters established 
by the dominant institutional values.’ (1999: 29) Institutions shape their own participants, by 
supplying ‘systems of meaning’ enabling institutions to express a ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
Thus an ‘institution defines a set of behavioural expectations for individuals in positions 
within the institution and then reinforces behaviour that is appropriate for the role and 
sanctions behaviour that is inappropriate.’ (Peters 1999: 30) By such means can normative 
institutions ‘enforce’ values, and shape decisions. Decision-makers, for example, may come 
to share particular values regarding the roles of political parties and their relationship to the 
state. 
 
4  
All this appears at first sight very different from older views of institutionalism. Normative 
institutionalism depends more on human agency than structure, because the emphasis on the 
role of institutions and the transmission or norms places more emphasis upon how members 
of an institution behave. For March and Olson (1989: 118), ‘decision-making styles ‘presume 
an order based on history, obligation and reason’. Whilst it has the merit of capturing a 
greater range of those things that guide individual behaviour, it runs the risk of rendering the 
concept ‘institution’ too broad as to be meaningful. As Rothstein puts it ‘if it means 
everything, then it means nothing.’ (1996: 145; see also Peters 1996: 215) In other words, if 
institutions need not consist of any structures, then there may be a point at which 
institutionalism is not open to falsification.  
 
One concept in particular which we can usefully draw from normative institutionalism is the 
notion of ‘optimality’ – a concept based upon normative criteria of optimal design. In this 
case, talk of ‘optimality’ of party funding institutions is related to the normative institutions 
that are the political traditions in the particular democracies concerned. The voluntaristic 
tradition, for example, is one key normative institution. In a distinct but related sense, the 
processes of institutional reform which, in our cases, are driven by questions surrounding the 
ability of pre-existing institutional framework to ‘deliver’ political behaviour. Political 
behaviour is judged against (and found to be performing ‘sub optimally’ in relation to) 
democratic probity, fairness and transparency, concepts that are in themselves normative 
institutions. Such considerations implicitly rest upon a particular model of democracy, ‘the 
appeal is, ultimately, to some larger moral code.... rooted in normative principles that are at 
the end of the day themselves independently defensible’ (Goodin, 1996: 39). 
 
Thus, from normative institutionalism, we can derive two hypotheses to predict the 
differences in reforms. First, we hypothesise that ‘appropriate behaviour’ will determine the 
form of regulation adopted. States where loophole seeking in party finance regulation (and 
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indeed more generally) is more commonplace will adopt a more strict regime; whilst states 
where the spirit of the law has been generally upheld will base compliance more upon trust of 
the parties and other relevant agents. Secondly, we hypothesise that normative traditions will 
shape the party-funding regime. Where there is a tradition of voluntarism, for example, this is 
likely to continue. Alternatively, where there is a tradition of the state intervening to aid a 
‘failing’ institution, then that tradition will be repeated. 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
The key aspect of historical institutionalism is that choices are made early in the history of 
any policy or system and these initial policy choices determine subsequent decisions. These 
choices may be normative, of course. Yet, whilst some initial choices will be based upon 
normative values, others will not. A policy choice may, for example, originate as a result of 
expediency. The point remains, however, that regardless of subsequent structural choices, 
initial choices in a policy field will have an enduring impact – they will shape both the 
strategies and goals pursued by political actors (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 8). This may be 
referred to as path dependency. Policy evolution can occur, but developments are constrained 
by the formative period of the institution (Guy Peters, 1999: 65).  
 
These constraints will also be influenced by historical preferences for certain ideas or core 
values. Here, institutions produce sets of ready solutions for policy problems, based upon 
enduring ideas. These contribute to limits on what are acceptable actions by governments or 
institutions. In many ways, this emphasis reveals the similarities between normative and 
historical institutionalist accounts – namely that core values, whether normatively driven or 
simple derived from organisational culture, provide constraints upon appropriate choices. 
Thus, attempts at institutional redesign are carried out against a backdrop of a set of past 
practices, which brings with it its own peculiar set or constraints and possibilities (Goodin 
1996, 30). For this reason, in each case, we need to establish the historical context within 
which the reforms have taken place. From an historical institutionalist perspective, therefore, 
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we develop a further hypothesis to explain variation in party finance reforms – that reforms 
will be path-dependent, based upon existing policy options which are adjudged to have 
performed successfully. 
 
Theories of Institutional Change 
Whereas institutional analysis focuses on the constraints that institutions place upon the 
actions of actors, it is nevertheless the case that institutions do themselves change. If reform 
has occurred, we must consider the reasons for the failure of institutions to adequately 
constrain the actors. We must also consider whether reforms have been genuinely 
fundamental or a simply a modified version of existing practice. Hall (1993) considers such 
questions. He argues that reform can be considered as being either first, second or third order 
change. First order change is characterised as policy instrument settings being changed in the 
light of experience and new knowledge, whilst the overall goals and instruments of policy 
remain the same (Hall, 1993: 278). Second order changes are characterised by changes in 
both the instruments and settings of policy in the light of past experience, but where the 
overall goals remain constant (Hall, 1993: 279). Finally, third order change entails 
‘simultaneous changes in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the 
instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy’ (Hall, 1993: 279).  
 
Our first theory of institutional change is intentional design by strategic agents. This is likely 
to occur when existing rules no longer serve the interests of dominant actors. Rooted in 
rational choice theory, this idea assumes that rational actors will design institutions to serve 
their own interests. Ideas about ‘constitutional engineering’ have been quite widely applied to 
electoral system reform (Sartori 1995; Taagepera & Shugart 1989) – rather less so to reforms 
in party funding regulations. The omission is curious, since such changes can have a profound 
effect on the relative strengths and advantages of particular parties. If constitutional 
engineering was to apply to party finance reform, we might consider whether existing 
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practices were serving the interests of the dominant parties. If not, we might assume that 
consensus would emerge over reform which would improve the dominant parties’ situation. 
Alternatively, it might be that dominant actors would seek to improve their own interests, 
possibly at the expense of political rivals. Our hypothesis from this perspective therefore is 
that party finance reforms will be designed to primarily benefit either the ruling party at the 
time of their inception or dominant political parties in general.  
 
A second theory of change is that change is evolutionary. As the political environment 
develops, selective mechanisms can lead to institutional change or survival. Our hypothesis 
here is that change in party finance regulation is driven principally by changes in the 
environment in which parties operate rather than being specific to concerns associated with 
party finance per se.  
 
A third theory is that change may occur when rules no longer confer legitimacy. Thus, when 
the institution becomes discredited, then change, even fundamental change, is likely. This is 
especially likely to occur when there is significant disjuncture between the values professed 
by an institution and its actual behaviour, or between the values of society and the behaviour 
of that institution (Guy Peters, 1999: 34). Goodin identifies a ‘trade-off between internal and 
external values’ achieved through institutional design, when institutions function well 
internally, but fail to produce outcomes desired by the rest of society (1996: 36-8). The 
greater the disjuncture, the greater the chance of change. Alternatively, change may occur 
when existing rules are no longer functional, especially if practices in other countries present 
a viable alternative. Our hypothesis therefore is that an increase in political scandals 
associated with party finance will provide a spur for changes in regulation. Of course, what 
constitutes a scandal, will be linked to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ within each country. 
 
A fourth theory draws on the idea of policy communities and institutional change. From this 
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perspective, a policy community may change if the resources that each actor possesses 
changes in value to other actors. This idea draws on the ideas of resource exchange pursued 
by Smith (1999). In the case of party finance, we may define a party finance community, 
consisting of parties and those that support them financially. If the resources of an actor 
within that community declines in relative importance, then the structure of that community 
may change. In addition, new actors may enter the policy community. Hall (1993), for 
example, argues that part of the explanation for the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to 
Monetarism in British economic policy was the growth in economic advice – specifically 
think-tanks and the media - from outside the conventional policy community. Thus, as 
‘outside’ economic advice gained legitimacy, so the resources of existing actors – in this case 
the Treasury’s monopoly over economic advice – declined. As a result, policy and the 
institution changed. Our hypothesis here is that a change in the balance of resources between 
members of the political finance community will lead to changes in party finance regulation. 
 
Background to Reform  
France 
French political finance in the Fifth Republic was characterised by a lack of regulation and a 
reliance on voluntary income. French parties, weakly embedded within civil society with 
comparatively low membership levels, were often dependent upon corrupt financing 
networks, channelled through their local elected officials. In the wake of corruption scandals, 
a rolling program of reforms began. 
 
Lack of Regulation 
De Gaulle’s famous suspicion of political parties, rooted in the Rousseauian suspicion of 
‘intermediary’ interests, finds expression in the 1958 Fifth Republic constitution. Although 
recognised by article 4, parties’ activities were completely unregulated and simply 
unrecognised in law. Until 1988, no rules or laws existed regarding political finance, other 
9  
than that corporate funding was illegal for both recipient and donor. Such a legal vacuum 
presented, according to one commentary, an ‘open door to corruption’ (Miguet 1999). 
 
Voluntary Income 
A voluntaristic, laissez faire notion that political parties and candidates could rely on the 
private sector, or unregulated market forces, underpinned the political finance regime. State 
aids were accordingly minimal.2 For many years, parties claimed3 to derive most of their 
funding from membership dues. Although never true, these claims became steadily less 
credible after the 1970s, given a combination of increased expenditure and declining and 
historically low membership (and attendant revenues). 
 
Corruption Scandals 
The 1980s saw an increasing number of high profile scandals.4 This increase in public 
concern was an essential catalyst in the reform process. There had been 29 party finance laws 
were proposed unsuccessfully between 1970 and 1988 (Doublet 1997: 60). By 1988, the 
number of political corruption scandals, how high up they went, and the degree of media 
attention afforded them generated the necessary political will. Reform was born out of a 
concern to fill the ‘vacuum’ as a means of tackling political corruption.  The reform process 
began by offering an amnesty covering all prior dubious practices, thus drawing a ‘line in the 
sand’ under long-established, corrupt practices by politicians and parties.5 Thereafter, the 
rationale behind the reform process has evolved to plug gaps, close loopholes, and tackle 
unforeseen consequences, not least in a bid to stop political corruption scandals which were 
unfolding with increased intensity and regularity throughout the reform process.  
 
Britain 
Three principles have characterised British political finance in the past century: campaign 
spending ceilings, voluntarism in party income and a lack of regulation generally. 
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Campaign Spending 
Prior to the 2000 Act, the principal act with regard to party and electoral finance was the 
Corrupt and Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act 1883. This was in part, a response to the 
perception that election expenditure had become excessive (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981: 26).  
Importantly, the act established the principle of election spending ceilings at constituency 
level as a means of regulating party finance. In essence, there was concern that wealthy 
candidates could buy votes.  
 
Voluntary Income 
British party finance is based largely upon voluntary income. There have, however, been shifts 
over time in the composition of those that fund parties. Funding initially came largely from 
wealthy individuals. From the last war through to the 1990s, institutions (companies and trade 
unions) were the principal funders, whilst in the past ten years, there has been a partial re-birth of 
funding from individuals. Limited state assistance has been available. However, it has been at a 
considerably lower level than in other democracies and much of it concerned with electoral 
contests rather than the day to day running of parties. Moreover, there have been enduring 
reservations about state funding, prompted by fears of an ossification of the party system, the 
assumption that it would lead to membership decline and a principled commitment to 
voluntarism.  
 
Lack of Regulation 
Hitherto, British party finance was remarkably unregulated. Prior to 2000, there were no limits 
on income. Any political party could raise as much money as it chose from as many sources as it 
could solicit funds. Legislation on transparency was limited and applied  only to institutional 
donations. From the 1970s, political finance was subject to periodic examination. However, 
with the exception of the introduction of financial aid for opposition parties in parliament, 
what distinguished these previous attempts from the new Act was their failure to implement 
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reform (Fisher, 2000). The election of a Labour government in 1997 meant however, that some 
reform was possible, the party having promised to re-examine the issue of party finance in its 
manifesto. Following this pledge, the Prime Minister instructed the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life (the Neill Committee) to examine the issue. The Committee reported in 1998 and all 
but one of the proposals were incorporated into the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000. 
 
Instruments and Mechanisms of Reforms 
 
Donations 
France  
Caps were introduced in 1988 (and subsequently amended) to limit the amount any one 
company or individual could contribute to any one candidate. Donations to parties were not 
subject to this limitation, which was seen to advantage candidates of major parties vis-à-vis 
candidates of smaller, less resource rich parties. An ambiguity remained surrounding party 
financing from companies (Miguet 1999: 58-9).  
 
Pierre Joxe, then Interior Minister and instigator of the 1990 legislation6 was frustrated in his 
efforts to keep business funding illegal by ‘realists’ (Joxe 1997). Business finance, hitherto 
been de jure illegal in France (although, de facto widespread), was legalised. In the 1993 
elections, with veil surrounding corporate funding lifted, it became apparent that three 
quarters of all business funding to parties came from firms liable to bid for contracts with 
local authorities run by party politicians (Knapp & Wright, 2001: 398). However, in the wake 
of further scandals, the 1995 legislation made business funding illegal once more. Donations 
from parties to candidates are not regulated. 
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Britain 
No change was made regarding any limits on the size of donation. However, shareholders are 
now to be balloted prior to political donations being made by companies. This authority will be 
valid for four years and will provide the board of directors with discretion during that period to 
make donations up to a prescribed limit. This compares with the ten yearly ballots required of 
trade unions holding a political fund. 
 
Disclosure & Transparency 
France 
The National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political Finance (CNCCFP), 
established by the January 1990 Law, subjected the financial affairs of parties & elected 
officials to audit to increase ‘financial transparency’ surrounding party finances and donations 
(CNCCFP 1992, 9). The 1990 law represented a considerable tightening, as accounts 
submitted had to include ‘even tacit’ benefits (see below), and both direct and indirect ‘in 
kind’ payments to candidates from party or group (Doublet 1997, 64-5). This directly tackled 
a serious loophole of 1988.  The legalisation of corporate funding in 1990 rendered overt 
those covert practices, which were as old as the political parties themselves in France. 
Arguably increased transparency has made such dubious practice harder to conceal.    
 
Britain 
Donations in excess of £5,000 nationally and £1,000 locally are now publicly declared. This 
includes ‘in kind’ payments. Anonymous donations to parties in excess of £200 are now 
prohibited, as are ‘blind trusts’; trusts set up where the donor’s identity is not known to the 
recipient.  
 
Foreign Donations 
In both countries, foreign donations have been banned. In France, foreign donations, direct or 
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indirect, from any state, person or organisation were banned in the 1988 law, whilst in Britain, 
the 2000 law permitted donations from only ‘permissible sources’ (for details, see Fisher, 2001: 
136). 
 
Campaign Spending Ceilings 
 
France 
After the 1988 legislation set the initial ceilings, covering the three months prior to the 
election, that coverage of ceilings was extended to 1 year in 1990. Whilst the second round 
presidential ceiling was raised in 1990, the parliamentary election ceiling was lowered in 
1993. To prevent circumvention, it was imperative ‘that all expenses of all campaigns should 
be retraced by the campaign account, including those incurred by persons or bodies other than 
the candidate. This is the origin of the notorious phrase of ‘even tacit’ consent of the 
candidate’ (Joxe 1997: 14). Yet this phrase was removed in December 1994. Joxe (1997: 14) 
laments ‘there is every reason to fear that the removal of this phrase was intended to render 
the ceiling inoperable’. 
 
Britain 
One of the 2000 act’s most radical clauses was the limit upon campaign spending at a national 
level in general elections. Hitherto, only local campaign expenditure had been regulated. For the 
purposes of the Act, the campaign period was defined as the 365 days preceding polling day in a 
general election. Of all the regulations, this was most likely to attract loophole seeking. However, 
the Neill Committee’s justification was to draw an analogy was with speed limits. A 30mph 
speed limit will not prevent drivers travelling at 35mph, but it is likely to prevent speeds of 
50mph.  
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State Funding 
 
France 
One of the most conspicuous aspects of the reforms in France has been the introduction and 
progressive scaling up of state funding of political parties, and departing from voluntaristic 
traditions. Prior to 1988, parties only received minimum support – for poster campaigns, and 
a limited amount of airtime. There was recognition, in the new legislation, that the market 
both could not, and perhaps should not, fulfil the role of funding political life. In 1988 the 
lump sum reimbursement of electoral expenses was extended, and provided for the first time 
public money proportionate to the number of seats won at election. 
 
The 1990 laws revised state funding arrangements, which were now calculated in two ways, 
ensuring parties received (quite generous) public funding – not only at election times, but also 
for running costs between elections. Half the funding went to those parties represented in 
parliament, according to number of deputies, the other half went to those parties fielding 
candidates in 75+ constituencies at general elections  – allocated pro rata according to number 
of votes polled in the first round of a general election.  
 
When, following further scandals, business funding became illegal again in 1995, parties and 
candidates received a ‘compensatory’ increase in state funding. Yet even with this increase in 
public funding, the parties could still not balance their books. The financial difficulties 
encountered after imposition of the 1990 regulations (implicitly indicating previously high 
levels of illicit business funding) continued. 
 
The guiding principles underpinning the increases in state funding were a desire for funding 
to reflect support for parties; balanced (particularly in the 1995 legislation) against a desire 
for ‘fairness’ to minor parties. Party funding should help small and emerging parties, to avoid 
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the ‘cartelisation’ problems associated with some state funding regimes (although, for a 
critique see Pierre et al, 2000). Financial ‘affirmative action’ was introduced, preventing 
extreme inequalities of expenditure between parties. Initially, there was a threshold of 5% on 
this funding, but this was ruled unconstitutional, discriminating against emerging political 
formations. Similar concerns informed the shift in eligibility from fielding candidates in 75 to 
50 constituencies. Specific provisions to help emergent parties contained in the 1995 
legislation were, in hindsight, perhaps not rigorous enough. State support was ‘limited’ to 
those parties which had raised 1m ff, a not inconsiderable sum, but there was no stipulation 
that the money must be in cheques, leaving its provenance completely unknowable.  In 
theory, this money was supposed to come from at least 10,000 people (including 500 elected 
officials) from at least 30 départements, yet there was nothing to prevent these being merely 
names out of the phone book! 
 
Indeed, even with the dimension of funding thought to benefit ‘established’ parties – relating 
to seats in parliament – ‘party’ proliferation and abuse was rife as a result of the creation of 
perverse incentives. Any ‘party’ could receive 290,000 ff per député – but it need only have 
one député to be an eligible party. As a result, Miguet notes, ‘a great many members of 
parliament ... created their own parties just to get public subsidies’ (1999: 72). In 1996, 165 
‘parties’ presented their accounts in a bid to receive state funding, a year earlier, the number 
had been 262, testament to attempts at opportunistic exploitation of the generosity of the party 
funding regime in France. The number of parties eligible for funding as a result of votes 
polled in parliamentary elections rose from 23 in 1997 to 32 in 2002.7 
 
Britain 
Although there were no proposals to extend state funding to levels that are comparable with other 
West European nations, there were two provisions, which do indicate that the principle of 
increased public funding has been more readily accepted. Firstly, following the recommendations 
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of the Neill Committee, ‘Short’ money was increased by a factor of 2.7 in 1999. Secondly, a 
Policy Development Fund was established, initially cash limited to £2 million per annum, to 
assist parties to engage more fully on policy development.  
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
Theoretical Interpretation  
 
French reforms  
Normative approaches offer more explanatory purchase over French reforms than does 
historical institutionalism. The status quo ante had, by 1988, demonstrated its inability to 
‘deliver’ corruption free political finance. Public confidence in the political system had been 
undermined, and the trust-based voluntarist institutions no longer appeared viable.  The 
‘failure’ of prior traditions and institutions of French political finance, led to a significant 
reform (both greatly increased regulation, and a massive scaling up of state funding). There is 
a parallel ‘failure’ of historical institutionalism to account for these changes, since historical 
institutions did little to constrain the path of reform chosen by policy-makers. 
 
Normative institutionalism fares rather better in accounting for French reforms.  The norms 
underpinning party finance have shifted away from a voluntarism that underpinned the 
laissez-faire attitude between 1958 and 1988. The ‘Rousseauian’ tradition imbued in French 
political culture a suspicion of parties as intermediary institutions in part explains the 
voluntarist tradition, the marginality of parties to the 1958 constitution, and the ensuing ‘legal 
vacuum’. These values, regarding the roles of political parties and their relationship to the 
state, were undermined, and failed to constrain decision-makers. However, other normative 
institutions within French political traditions powerfully shaped the path of reform.  
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The reform process after 1988 reflected a rebalancing in the relative importance of elements 
of the French republican tradition.  Laissez faire’s failure to deliver ‘external’ legitimacy 
beckoned a response from the powerful etatiste dimension of the French Republican tradition. 
This presupposes a preponderant role for the state in shaping French politics and society 
according to republican values (see Hazareesingh 1994, Chs. 3 & 6). Thus where ‘weak’ civil 
society had failed, the ‘strong’ French state stepped in, both to regulate political finance, and 
to provide state funding. This statist solution to societal problems is in keeping with deep-
rooted norms of French political culture, prevalent, for example, in the field of industrial 
relations (Milner, 1998).  
 
Thus, whilst at the level of mechanism to deliver goals, there was significant change, at the 
level of the ultimate goals of the party funding regime, there was continuity. The ‘higher’ 
normative institution of the French model of party democracy endured. Although regarded 
with some suspicion, and, as noted above, relatively weakly embedded in civil society, a 
widespread consensus remained regarding the centrality of parties to a functional French 
democracy. The means to deliver a competitive party-based liberal democracy shifted from a 
laissez-faire to an etatiste approach, but the goal was to deliver freely competitive political 
parties. French parties remained voluntary organisations, albeit now underwritten by 
significant state funding, and subject to greater regulation.  
 
French normative traditions also help explain the enforcement of rules. A partially politicised 
and often subservient judiciary has long been a feature of the French Republican tradition 
(Knapp & Wright, 2001: 380-4). These norms, although recently challenged by increased 
judicial activism, have characterised electoral judges enforcement of the rules-based political 
finance regime. An elastic get-out clause, added to the statute book in 1996, allowed judges to 
pardon all contraventions of the spending limits and electoral rules where the ‘good faith’ of 
the defendant can be established. This came in the wake of a series of cases of ‘offenders’ in 
18  
municipal elections being ‘let off’. These developments meant that, ‘financial irregularity is 
no longer systematically sanctioned’ (Doublet: 1997: 77). 
 
The French case, though, although demonstrating some significant continuities, is perhaps 
more characterised by institutional change. Consequently, this needs be located within 
frameworks of change. Several of the theories outlined above are of some use in accounting 
for change in France. Institutional redesign by strategic agents is of some use in explaining 
the early reforms, for example in relation to the establishment of a party funding system 
which rewards parliamentarians, and within which the major parties within the system seem 
to gain relative to smaller parties. Perhaps the best example is Balladur’s rewriting of the 
rules prior to his 1995 presidential campaign.8 One could also point to parties creating a 
‘clean slate’– allowing them to remain in power, despite dubious practices, as well as 
(initially), legalising corporate funding following earlier widespread abuse of the law.  
Moreover, actors have been able to insert intentional laxity into latter stages of reform to limit 
impact on certain behaviour patterns, the best example perhaps being the initial inclusion, and 
subsequent exclusion, of  ‘even tacitly’ agreed financial support within the spending ceilings. 
The succession of new laws gave the impression of parties tackling the problem of party 
finance, whilst creating a regulatory framework which left sufficient loopholes for parties and 
candidates to exploit.  
 
However, this theory of institutional change has little explanatory purchase over 
developments in the field of spending ceilings and disclosure, and corporate donations (illegal 
again after 1995). Katz & Mair’s ‘Cartel Party’ thesis sees augmenting of party funding as the 
advancing inter-penetration of party and state; ‘the state … becomes an institutionalised 
structure of support, sustaining insiders and excluding outsiders’ (1995: 16). This is at 
variance with the evidence regarding the evolution of state funding and political parties in the 
1990s.9 Despite an increase in public funding, certain ‘insider’ parties encountered enhanced 
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financial difficulties. Furthermore, contra Katz & Mair’s cartel thesis, specific provision to 
foster the development of small, emerging political currents and movements has been written 
into French party funding laws.  
 
The notion of institutional change as a result of shifts within the policy community is to some 
extent useful in analysing changes in the approach to business funding. A distinction should 
be made between the nominal and real funding communities prior to 1988. Although 
nominally, parties claimed that membership was predominant within their funding 
communities, in reality ‘occult’ sources of funds, predominantly from business donors, were 
highly significant. This makes the precise ‘resource allocation’ within the policy community 
difficult to establish conclusively. Due to this opacity, we cannot discern whether 
fundamental shifts in resources within the community prior to 1988 were the causes of 
change. However, this seems unlikely, given that pre-existing arrangements appeared 
functional to actors and the ‘internal’ values (Goodin 1996: 36) of that system were accepted 
by all actors. The changing the composition of the funding community was then more effect 
than cause of the 1990 reform, which, by explicitly recognising its true nature, was able to 
bring it within the state’s regulatory framework. Thereafter, there was a conscious effort to 
reshape the party finance ‘policy community’ in France – both by excluding business donors 
from this, since their previously preponderant role within the community was deemed ‘sub-
optimal’, and also by expanding the state’s funding and regulatory role, empowering the state 
within the funding policy community. 10 
 
Perhaps the most convincing theory of institutional change in the French context is the failure 
of institutions to confer legitimacy. The notion of ‘optimality’ is useful here – the institutional 
design was guided by a notion of party democracy. The intentions of groups and individuals 
driving the redesign of institutions, since the context of reform was public debate over 
concerns about standards in public life, concentrating on issues of transparency, equity and 
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democratic probity. The context of financial scandals embroiling all the main parties is crucial 
to understanding the reforms. Notions of the ‘optimal’ set of party funding arrangements, 
laying emphasis on transparency and disclosure, and upon the importance of a ‘fair’ level 
playing field of party competition, underpin moves such as the establishment of spending 
ceilings, and of the CNCCFP to oversee their observance.  
 
British Reforms 
An examination of the key British reforms suggests first, the utility of both the normative and 
historical approaches. First, the principle of campaign ceilings has been maintained. The 
decision to adopt national campaign ceilings has an historical precedent, local campaign 
ceilings having been in place in 1883. Then, they were introduced partly through concerns 
about excessive election expenditure as well as concerns regarding the ability of wealthy 
candidates to gain political advantage. In the 2000 legislation, the use of this technique at 
national level to address virtually identical concerns was echoed. National ceilings were 
introduced because of a concern with the spending arm’s race, and as a means by which the 
putative impact of differential party wealth upon electoral outcomes could be tempered.11 
From the viewpoint of the historical institutionalism, therefore, we can argue that the initial 
design to counteract perceived problems of electoral inequality has been repeated. Spending 
limits have been adopted rather than other means of equalising electoral contests, such as state 
funding. Thus, historical precedent provided a constraint on other possible policy options on 
the basis that it has been seen to work relatively well at local level. 
 
Normative institutionalism also fits well. First, it is clear that the values of voluntarism in 
party finance have been maintained, despite a modest extension of state funding. The Neill 
Committee and the government rejected extensive state funding largely on grounds of 
principle – namely that the taxpayer should not be obliged to fund parties with whom he does 
not agree. In addition, there was a view that state funding would have the effect of reducing 
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civic engagement and that the adoption of national expenditure ceilings would reduce the 
need for state assistance. The government took its opposition to state funding even further. It 
rejected the Neill Committee’s recommendation for tax relief on political donations, since this 
would be a kind of state funding by stealth, as such monies would normally go to the 
Treasury. Arguably, this reflects a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in terms of the most politically 
acceptable means of funding political parties. A second key normative value is also apparent 
with regard to donations. Whilst some new restrictions have emerged, the principle that 
anyone can give as much as they choose is maintained. Calls to limit the size of donations 
were resisted at that time, though since 2001, these calls have grown louder (Fisher, 2002b). 
 
Normative traditions in Britain also help explain enforcement of the new legislation. On the 
one hand, the degree of regulation and therefore enforcement goes well beyond what was 
previously permissible. However, where France uses the courts to regulate, the principal 
institution in Britain is a quasi-judicial Electoral Commission. Moreover, the Neill Committee’s 
report makes a tacit admission that watertight legislation is virtually impossible in drawing the 
analogy between loophole seeking and speed limits. Thus, whilst parties are clearly now subject 
to greater regulation, the implicit value of trust remains.  
 
Notwithstanding these examples of institutional continuity however, there has nevertheless 
been some significant institutional change. Consequently, this needs be located within 
frameworks of change. Several of the theories outlined above would seem to fit with the 
evidence from Britain. First, the notion of institutional design by strategic agents has some 
resonance. On the one hand, it would be difficult to argue that the new legislation has been 
designed to damage political opponents. In only one area could one argue that the impact is 
differential – the requirement for shareholder ballots, which may impact upon Conservative 
income disproportionately. By the same token, however, spending limits may be seen as 
having been more of a hindrance to Labour, since at the time it was the wealthier of the two 
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main parties (Fisher, 2001). Indeed, the limits reduce the differential between the two main 
parties and the Liberal Democrats (though on the evidence of the 2001 election, at least, that 
differential remains significant). However, one could argue that the legislation serves the 
interests of dominant parties, since there has been an increase in state funding which will 
nonetheless be directed at parties with seats in Parliament. Thus, the financial situation of 
dominant parties will improve, albeit modestly and the continued emphasis on voluntarism, 
may in one sense preserve the dominant position of the principal parties.  
 
The evolutionary theory of institutional change is also instructive. The environment in which 
parties operate is changing: election campaigning is more sophisticated, more long-term and 
there are now many more elections in which parties compete. Consequently, parties have 
greater need for income and therefore are likely to seek funds from a wider variety of sources. 
This may cause disquiet, especially if donations are large. Consequently, the requirement to 
declare donations (as a mechanism to discourage corruption); national spending limits (as a 
mechanism to suppress the need for income) and limited state funding (as a means of ring-
fencing money for non-campaign activities) are all evidence of institutional changes in 
response to evolutionary changes in parties’ funding requirements. 
 
A third theory of change, whereby change occurs when rules no longer confer legitimacy is 
similarly instructive. There is ample evidence to suggest that during the 1980s and 1990s, as 
with the more general questions of sleaze, that party finance arrangements came under 
increasing pressure (Fisher, 1994, 1997, 2000). Concerns about large donations and funding 
from overseas together with perennial concerns over the possibility of reciprocity arising from 
trade union and corporate donations, meant that disjuncture was seemingly occurring between 
the values of society and the behaviour of parties. This culminated in the Ecclestone affair in 
late 1997. Existing rules on donations were lax, but the apparent increasing willingness of 
parties to exploit what was technically legal meant that the disjuncture grew and the existing 
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institution became increasingly illegitimate. In addition, whilst arrangements in other 
comparable nations were not perfect, they did appear to offer viable alternatives to British 
funding arrangements. As a consequence, the new Act introduced a range of measures to 
address this disjuncture, including declaration of donations, a ban on foreign donations and 
clear rules regarding accounting procedures. 
 
A fourth theory of change pertains to changes in the resource balance within communities as 
precursors to institutional change. We may highlight five such changes. First, the willingness 
or companies to fund parties appears to have waned. Secondly, the relative importance of 
trade union income to the Labour Party has declined. Thirdly, the importance of individual 
donations, especially large ones, has increased. Fourthly, new sources of advice raised the 
question of institutional reform. The media focussed heavily on the ‘problem’ of party 
finance, whilst the establishment of the Committee on Standards in Public Life provided a 
further source of legitimate advice, especially given its notable success in reforming other 
aspects of British political life (Fisher, 2002a). Finally, within the party finance community, 
Labour assumed government, whilst the Conservatives lost badly. All of these changes to the 
community are significant. Individual donations present parties with different streams of 
income, but are sources which may be less long-term, and which may be in need of 
regulation, since none previously existed. In the case of the parties, the shifting balance of 
political power meant that change was more likely, since the Conservatives had resisted 
change as late as 1994, despite many of the other prompts for institutional change being 
apparent. Labour, by way of contrast, had made a manifesto pledge on regulating party 
finance. In the case of new members of the community, the establishment and success of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life made it very difficult to resist the proposed reforms. 
 
Conclusions 
An initial striking similarity between the cases is the lack of regulation prior to recent reform 
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– both political finance communities had remained in this sense largely unchanged for a 
considerable time. What is interesting is the different ‘paths’ taken. We will conclude by 
asking, to what extent has our understandings of these processes of party funding reform been 
added to by employing theories and concepts derived from a  ‘new institutionalist’ 
perspective? 
 
Historical institutionalism is highly relevant in the British case, less so in France. Normative 
institutionalism, however, is important in both cases. The importance of pre-existing values to 
constitutional reform processes has been demonstrated, albeit in very different ways. In 
Britain, the enduring resilience of the voluntarist tradition has been amply demonstrated. In 
France the etatiste tradition can be invoked to explain the path chosen. The notion of a ‘logic 
of appropriateness’ has also been useful – both in terms of the operation of institutions and 
also in understanding the behaviour of actors within them. The distinctive logics of 
appropriateness in each case closely mirrors the ‘trust versus rules’ distinction we made in 
relation to enforcement. In France, the norms – or logic of appropriateness of actors within 
the system tended to involve ‘occult’ funding loophole seeking. This led to a rules based, 
judicial approach. In the British case, on the other hand, the logic of appropriateness tended 
not to involve loophole seeking. This informs the choice of a more trust based, and only 
quasi-judicial approach. 
 
The use of both normative and historical institutionalism also helps us evaluate the extent of 
policy change with reference to Hall’s (1993) typology. It seems fair to conclude that Britain 
has experienced second-order change. Clearly, reforms have been greater than first-order 
change, which involves simply making changes to the settings of policy instruments. Rather, 
the instruments of policy were altered in response to past experience, though the overall 
policy goals remained the same. Thus, in Britain, whilst dissatisfaction with existing practices 
partly prompted reform such as restrictions on donations and spending caps, the goals 
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remained the same – parties remained principally voluntary organisations.  
 
France is a more radical shift, but in Hall’s terms still second order change. In addition to 
second order changes in the form of spending caps and donation limitations, progressive 
scaling up of state funding (particularly after the outlawing of business funding) represents a 
more fundamental shift from a laissez-faire to an etatiste approach.  All major parties in 
France are today dependent on the state, which provides in excess of 50% of all the party 
income of all major parties (Knapp, 2002: 127). However, whilst at the level of mechanisms 
and policy instruments to deliver goals, there was dramatic change, at the ‘higher’ level of the 
ultimate goals of the party funding regime -  freely competitive party-based liberal democracy 
- there was continuity.  Parties remain voluntary organisations, and measures have been 
introduced to maintain their private sources of funding. Indeed, loopholes in ceiling limits 
have been created to positively encourage such financing.  
 
The theories of institutional change have different degrees of relevance. Critically, however, 
intentional design by purely rational actors does not seem convincing, since in both cases 
‘insider’ parties have not enhanced their position significantly vis-à-vis outsiders, and tighter 
disclosure and transparency regulations impose considerable costs upon parties. Thus, the 
rational choice framework here appears of little value, since evidence of actors being guided 
by purely rational incentives is at best limited.  
 
However, if we conceptualise the intentions of our purposive agents as not being purely self-
regarding, but guided by some notion of optimal party democracy, the evidence fits the theory 
rather better. Measures relating to provision for smaller parties in France, for example, have 
been guided by a need for fairness in party competition. In Britain, there has been a limited 
view of the more level playing field. In both cases, the centrality of transparency to an 
optimal party funding regime has strongly influenced the reform process. Here the idea of a 
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disjuncture between ‘internal’ values of institutions and ‘external’ values of wider society 
usefully explains the impetus for funding reform in the context of sleaze and scandals. The 
need to enhance the democratic probity of party funding arrangements was central to the 
‘optimal’ notion of party democracy guiding the process. 
 
In conclusion, this article has demonstrated that new institutionalism (or at least some forms 
of it) provides a persuasive framework for analysis of party finance reform. The focus of 
much work on constitutional engineering is too narrowly focussed. We are not hostile to the 
use of rational choice theory (far from it) – rather we argue simply that it does not provide a 
convincing explanation for institutional change in these examples. Thus, we may characterise 
the reforms enacted of political finance in Britain and France as, ‘the deliberate interventions 
of purposive goal-seeking agents’ (Goodin, 1996:25). In the light of these findings, we argue 
that the notion of constitutional engineering should be conceived more widely, and analysts 
should extend their gaze to include the instruments, mechanisms and consequences of party 
funding regimes. 
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Table 1 
Instruments and Mechanisms of Reforms 
 
 France Britain 
Donations  1988 Law – Tax relief on donations to candidates, limited to 20,000ff 
(€3,049) by individuals, 50,000ff  (€7,622) by organisations. 
Ambiguity over legality of corporate donations to companies. 
 1990 Law – Corporate donations legalised. Ceilings on both 
individual and corporate donations - Parties were entitled to receive 
50,000ff (€7,622) from individuals, and 500,000ff (€76,225) from 
corporate bodies per year. 
 1995 – Corporate donations made illegal once more 
 No limit on donation size.  
 Shareholders to be balloted prior to corporate donations being made.  
Disclosure & Transparency 
 
 
 Detailed annual accounts and donations declared to new National 
Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political Finance 
(CNCCFP) and published. Compelled revealing the identity of 
donors. 
 Declaration of ‘tacit’ donations introduced in 1990 to tackle 
loopholes of 1988 act 
 ‘Tacit’ donations subsequently excluded in 1994 
 Donations in excess of £5,000 (€7,509) nationally and £1,000 
(€1,502) now regularly declared to new Electoral Commission 
 Declaration includes ‘in kind’ payments. 
 Anonymous donations effectively banned 
Foreign Donations  Foreign donations banned in 1988  Foreign Donations banned 
Campaign Spending Ceilings  1988 Law – spending ceilings established for legislative (500,000ff  
[€76.225] per candidate) and presidential (120m ff [€18.3m], rising 
to 140m [€21.3m] in the 2nd ballot) elections. Campaign defined as 3 
months before election 
 1990 Law – campaign period extended to one year. Raised 2nd round 
presidential ceiling to 160m ff (€24.4m). 
 1993 Law – Assemblée nationale ceilings revised (500, 000 > 
250,000ff [€72,225 > €38,112] per candidate plus 1ff [€0.15]per 
inhabitant – average total 350,000ff [€53,357]) 
 National campaign spending limits set (£30,000 [€45,051] per 
contested constituency) – previously only constituency limits 
 Campaign period defined as 365 days before election 
 Spending limits for Westminster and non-Westminster elections 
State Funding  All funding subject to condition of submitting accounts 
 1988 Law – Lump sum reimbursement of electoral expenses 
extended significantly - calculated proportionate to seats won at 
election.  (5% threshold) 
 1990 Law – Calculation of state funding changed. Half to parties in 
parliament (relative to number of deputies - each worth 290,000 ff 
[€44,210] per year), half to parties fielding more than 75 candidates 
(each vote worth 11.9 ff [€1.8] per year).  
 Subsequently reduced to 50 constituencies; 5% threshold ruled 
unconstitutional 
 1995 – ‘compensatory’ increase in state funding when  business 
funding made illegal once more. Electoral expenses reimbursed rose 
from 5% to 50% of the ceiling on expenditure.   
 Limited increase in state funding – remains modest in comparison 
 Increase in parliamentary support (‘Short’ money) 
 Establishment of Policy Development Fund  
2  
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Notes 
                                                          
1  This research has been supported by the British Academy. Ref: OCG-34841 
2  Principally, reimbursement of printing costs for election campaigns (ballot papers, circulars, 
deposits)– if passed 5% vote threshold; Parliamentary funding (aides, parliamentarians 
budgets); and provision for political broadcasts. 
3  In the French case, unreliability of both claims and evidence regarding party membership 
levels, and secrecy surrounding party finance have made claims impossible to verify 
4  Examples include the Luchaire affair, where contracts for arms to Iran between 1982 and 1986 
(the defence minister ‘overlooked’ arms sales restrictions) were traded for donations to PS 
coffers from arms firms. In another example, Christian Nucci, then Minister for co-operation, 
set up ‘Carrefour du developpement’ in 1983, an association supposedly providing African 
aid, into which he diverted massive sums, for himself as well as his campaign funds. 
5  This has been less than successful, as significant financing scandals have continued to emerge 
after the reforms in the 1990s. See for example ‘Alain Juppé  vedette du procès des emplois 
fictifs du RPR’ Le Monde 29.09.03. 
6  The most rigorous and stringent package passed in the ‘legislative incontinence’ of the late 
80s and 90s – which were subsequently ‘loosened’ in key respects. 
7   Libération 8th June 2002. 
8  When Prime Minister, Balladur, in his presidential bid in 1995, promoted an amendment 
enabling the creation of campaign support committees, similar to parties (and thus exempt 
from restrictions on donations to candidates). Balladur’s campaign drew benefit from 98 such 
committees.(Doublet 1999, 74). 
9  Katz & Mair’s thesis posits that the ‘inter-penetration of party and state’ and ‘collusion and 
co-operation between ostensible competitors’ (1995: 17) allows insider parties to ‘minimise 
the consequences of competition within the cartel, and protect themselves from the 
consequences of electoral dissatisfaction’ (1995: 23). Despite generous state funding, French 
governmental parties were very severely affected by electoral defeats. The PS after 1993 
(whose annual state subsidy plummeted from 167m ff to 90m), and the RPR after 1997 
(whose funding fell by 50m ff) were forced into serious belt-tightening. 
10  Withdrawal or suspension of state funding, for example,  became a powerful sanction against 
malfeasance. 
11  Although as Fisher (1999) has found, the evidence to suggest enhanced national performance 
as a result of increased spending is not compelling.  
